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In this thesis I have studied the effect that the euro has had on European Union trade 
patterns among its members. The data used in from different 26 EU countries that go 
from 1993 to 2010. During this period several European countries entered into a 
common currency union, besides old socialist Eastern European countries did access to 
the European Union and later on to the euro itself. Using gravity equation theory, I 
have tried to estimate the size of the effect of the euro, which goes from 8% to 12% in 
the simplest specification and reaching 26% for the most complex ones. Other 
concerns affecting the gravity equation have also been addressed in this paper. 
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1.1 General notes 
Since the end of Second World War European integration has been an essential factor 
of the European history. It first started as a trade agreement and then turned into a 
political union. In the end of the 20th century, the monetary integration among most 
of its members was agreed and completed. Whether it is a culmination of economic 
integration or a step further into political union is still to be seen.  
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the agreement that include both currently 
eurozone-countries and those that will be part of it in the future. The introduction of 
the single currency has had important consequences economically both in Europe and 
the whole world.  
It is very important to put the EMU in perspective, because it has not been a one-time 
thing but it is part of a gradual European economic integration. This integration has 
increased the interdependence of the region’s countries. Whether to measure the 
success of this integration in trade flows or price convergence is a point of discussion. 
The former has been the most used one in monetary union researches as it is easier to 
gather and it has no comparison problems. Although (O'Rourke, 2002) argues that 
price convergence is an ultimate effect of trade integration and an irrefutable 
evidence. 
One aspect of a currency union is that in terms of trade it can be seen as factor that 
reduces trade barriers among its members. For instance the disappearance of 
exchange rate transaction costs and risks. Though these risks can be hedged at a cost, 
long-term volatility ones are neither easy nor cheap. In addition, every business has 
uncertainty on the amount of demand it will get, hedging currency risk on the demand 
side is everything but perfect. Moreover, these costs get larger the smaller countries 
are, and Europe is full of them. 
According to trade theory, a decrease in trade costs between two countries has two 
different effects. First, it would increase trade between these two nations. And second 
it would decrease trade with third countries as goods from them become relatively 
more expensive compared to those within the monetary union. 
Nevertheless, when a monetary union is done there are more things going on apart 
from trade cost reduction that may also affect trade indirectly. Besides, the EMU is not 
an ordinary monetary union, but is one between advanced and big countries that has 
further implications even with countries that have not adopted the euro yet.  
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1.2 Problem statement 
This paper is about how the euro has influenced and affected intra-EU trade, size and 
direction of the effect. This implies both eurozone-countries and non-eurozone ones. It 
is not a point of the study to analyze the effect with other major world economies but 
those inside the EU. The point is to gather similar economies in order to get rid of any 
omitted variables that might affect economies outside the EU and thus introduce more 
noise in the results. As the EU was created with trade purposes and it has evolved until 
the EMU, integration and convergence issue is easier approached with a smaller and 
more similar sample. It is also easier to dig deeper in country specific characteristics. 
When it relates to methodology, the gravity equation for trade will be the one 
selected, especially the one that has been specifically used in previous monetary union 
related papers. Hence, this theory will be taken as given, especially (Micco, Stein, & 
Ordoñez, 2003) specification. Although some new issues will be considered as well. 
1.3 Outline summary 
Next two sections contain a literature review on overall currency unions first and then 
on euro specific topics. Section 4 shows up the data and methodology used for my own 
findings. Section 5 is mainly focused on replicating and updating previous researches. 
Section 6 is where the real fun is, I mean, where I tried some specification I am 
concerned about. In section 7 a robustness check is made in addition to other previous 
models. And finally section 8 contains the conclusions of the thesis. 
2. Currency Unions’ literature 
This section might seem quite long, but I consider it to be a key part related to the 
econometric model of this thesis, making it easier to be followed up. 
2.1 Rose model 
The paper by (Rose, 2000) was the first one to analyze the effect of currency unions on 
trade. Before, the only studies that could somehow estimate this effect where those 
investigating the border effect. This effect consist on how a national border can reduce 
trade between two countries, it captures a mixture of different factors that distinguish 
one country from another, affecting more to small countries (Anderson & van 
Wincoop, 2001). 
The researches by (McCallum, 1995) and (Helliwell, 1998), where they analyze the 
border effect between Canadian provinces and US states, gather data before and after 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We must realize that both 
countries cannot be more similar, same language, similar culture, legal system and 
after 1994 the free trade area was created. So it can be said that the only remaining 
substantial difference is the currency, therefore the fact that Canadians provinces 
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trade between them an average of 10 to 20 times more than with US states is kind of a 
proxy of the effect that a currency union might have. (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) 
Even though currency difference is the most obvious difference, there are more things 
going on such as historical supply chain links. 
Going back to (Rose, 2000), he is the one responsible of a new line of study in 
international economics according to (Baldwin, 2006). He collected an impressive 
amount of data concerning 186 nations, colonies and offshore departments from 1970 
to 1990. He discarded null and missing values as he uses logarithms to measure the 
variables. And plotted all in this equation below: 
ln	
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
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Being trade real bilateral trade from origin country o to destination d at time t, Y real 
GDP of the country, dist the distance between both nations and CU the currency union 
dummy. In addition, he controls for several other variables like language, religion, 
former colony status,… The results were surprisingly high, implying that a current 
union may boost trade a 235% on average (  1.21;  
. % 1  2.35) on his 
favorite regression. 
He considers a currency union pair countries that share the same currency with a unite 
central bank, and not just a fix exchange rate system. The observations containing CU 
agreements are three different kinds as (Baldwin, 2006) states. First, those called hub-
and-spoke based on a big nation hub like the US, Australia or UK, and their overseas 
islands and territories spokes, which are very small and open economies. Involving a 
wide variety of products on their trading between the hub and the spoke, but almost 
negligible trade between spokes as they are tiny and far apart from each other 
normally. This type is the most abundant one in the CU observations in the regression, 
raising lots of concerns as we will see. 
Second group are two multilateral currency unions among poor and small nations. 
These two are the West African CFA and the Caribbean Currency Union. Third is mostly 
omitted from the sample and are those agreements where one nation rules over 
monetary policy of another which is tiny, like Italy and San Marino, Spain and Andorra 
or India and Bhutan. 
2.2 Critics to Rose 
Arguments against the paper have been numerous from the very beginning. And they 
include a wide variety of aspects of the study, from the econometric methodology 
used to sample problems and reached conclusions. None of these critics have 
forgotten the key issue, which has been to open a new study line concerning currency 
unions. Being the Rose the first one to do so despite all the problems. 




(Baldwin, 2006) and (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006) papers summarize and rank three 
methodological errors committed in the Rose paper, the latter applied to eurozone 
specific studies. They are supported with large amount of mathematical 
demonstrations that I will not include in here. They call the medal mistakes as they are 
ranked from #1 or gold medal till #3 or bronze. 
Starting at top 3, the bronze medal mistake concerns the method used to deflate and 
turn into real units the trade flows, which is the explained variable. (Rose, 2000) uses 
the US consumer price index as trade flows are measured in dollars. Ideally the best 
deflator would be a world price index, but as long as it is not available Rose uses the 
US one as the best proxy, it is the biggest open to free trade nation. Since the time 
series is long enough to be affected by global trends on inflation on other countries, it 
would induce a bias in the results. Baldwin states that it is somehow solved this bias 
using time dummies to correct for world trends. 
Second mistake or silver medal is related to the fact that trade flows used in (Rose, 
2000) are bilateral trade flows, it is the result of averaging all four different trade 
measures available (exports and imports, both in FOB and CIF1). This error that Baldwin 
finds is linked to the mathematical issue that the logarithm of a mean is not the 
average of the logarithms separately2. This can be a big source of biasness the larger 
the trade unbalance is between trade partners. Introducing a great systematic error on 
North-South trade compared to North-North one, thus unbalance partners will see 
their trade boosted artificially. Even in Germany’s trade with EU15 and other OECD 
countries where the unbalance is supposed to be fairly small, (Baldwin, 2006) finds out 
that the error is about 15% of real trade figures. 
Finally here it comes the big one; the gold medal is for an omitted variables bias. 
(Baldwin, 2006) strongly criticizes that pooled OLS method leave behind many 
variables that individually considered are negligible but together they become a big 
problem. He proposes as the ideal method to use country-pair time-varying fix effects, 
this would make disappear any other variable in the model though. Thus, these within 
estimator method will help eliminating any omitted variable trail. No later on study on 
the topic does not approach the equation this way, moreover is normally the preferred 
specification by the authors. 
When Rose review his work in (Rose & van Wincoop, 2001) and (Glick & Rose, 2001), 
Baldwin still have concerns about it. The former uses country specific dummies, which 
drops the Rose effect to 136% from 235% of the original paper. Yet this specification 
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might continue suffering from omitted variable and should thus either be time-varying 
or country-pair specific. The latter is the one used in (Glick & Rose, 2001), where the 
Rose effect falls larger to 91%. But we will look closer at these papers later.  
Reverse causality 
Another important issue argued by some authors such as (Persson, 2001) is that 
adopting a common or other country’s currency is not random choice. Countries that 
are close to each other, share language, former colonies, are part of the same nation, 
small economies or those that already have large trade relations are the ones more 
likely to establish a currency union. He shows it in a table where the mean values of 
several variables in currency unions observations can be compared to those that are 
not. Therefore currency union dummy would be and endogenous variable in the model 
giving biased results. He suggests as a possible solution to build a propensity score that 
would represent the likelihood of two countries being part of a currency union. 
Source: (Persson, 2001) 
In his currency unions papers review for the European Central Bank, (Baldwin, 2006) 
quote several studies that used instrumental variable methodologies to address this 
problem. Astonishingly, their most conservative results are that the Eurozone 
formation would more than double world trade. Obviously, the findings are 
meaningless.  
(Devereux & Lane, 2003) discovered just the opposite. Trading partners tend to 
stabilize bilateral exchange rates to each other, being a monetary union the ultimate 
step of stabilization. However, I personally think that there is a long shot from fixing 
exchange rates to common currency. Fix rates break-ups are widely seen historically 
and there is not much confidence about the length they will last, but it is the fact that a 
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currency union is almost irreversible what makes businessmen trust that they got rid 
of long-term exchange rates risk for the foreseeable future and build-up life-long 
business relationships or investments.  
On the other hand, (Tenreyro & Barro, 2003) argue that the decision for many 
countries to adopt other’s currency is because it is stable and there is no mutual 
economic relation argument behind. Thus they find no clue for endogeneity bias. 
An excellent case study against reverse causality was posed by (Frankel, 2008). The 
African CFA members are a group of sub-Saharan countries that share a common 
currency which was fixed to the French franc. They were former French colonies, 
except Equatorial Guinea, are small and poor economies, speak French, close to each 
other,… they fulfill every condition to be a likely currency union between them and 
with France. But suddenly in 1999 they became also linked to other countries like 
Finland, Italy or Ireland which have nothing to do with them. Interestingly he regressed 
this and found out that the euro boosted bilateral trade between European countries 
(excluding France) and CFA countries by 76%, where it is obvious that there is no 
endogeneity.  
Misspecification problems 
Model misspecification was first exposed by (Persson, 2001). He was worried mainly 
about possible non-linearities within the Rose model. Even in (Rose, 2000) did actually 
appear a model using the quadratic term for output, he did not put too much 
importance. Persson per contra focus his attention on it. Adding the output quadratic 
term to the model the Rose effect falls from 235% to 97%, being the output square 
coefficient highly significant. 
On the graph next page we can observe this relationship between trade flow residuals 
and GDP. Empty white dots represent currency union observations and the black dots 
are the rest non-currency union ones. The dashed line shows the estimated linear fit of 
the regression, while the solid curved line is the quadratic estimation we have been 
talking about. Most CUs tend to be in the lower part, as we have previously seen they 
tend to be smaller economies. Interestingly there are lots of them above the dashed 
line; this mismatch with output would be however captured by the currency union 
dummy pumping up its effect artificially. 
(Baldwin, 2006) adds up that before the articles of (Rose, 2000) and (Persson, 2001), 
non-linearity was not considered as a problem in gravity equation studies. Now still 
unknowing the correct form of non-linearity, we know that it exist and should be 
considered. Especially the more extreme and varying values are used, which is the case 
with plenty of tiny economic nations. 
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Another type of model misspecification that (Persson, 2001) takes into account are the 
crossed relationship between variables. The two suggested are free trade area (FTA) 
and language, arguing that it should have a positive combined effect as both 
characteristic makes them more similar to a unite country where there are no 
significant manmade trade barriers. The second one is colonial history and output with 
an expected negative conjunct effect. It can be interpreted from the point of view of 
small overseas nations where after independence, if achieved, trade bonds were 
already done and remain undestroyed; while this is not as important for bigger 
countries. For instance all the small islands in the pacific that are or used to be part of 
France or UK still trade more with them than with big nearer nation around like 
Australia, US or Japan. There is one condition for this interpretation in order to be 
correct, that the net effect colony plus colony crossed output is still positive, at least 
for the lower GDP deciles. Both crossed coefficient signs fell where expected and were 
highly significant. 
Source: (Persson, 2001) 
An extra point that (Anderson & van Wincoop, 2001) develops is a model of 
multilateral resistance term, also called relative prices matter in (Baldwin, 2006). It 
refers to the fact that gravity equation model are based on absolute variables to 
approximate trade barriers, per contra they suggest to build up a relative trade barrier 
model like classical trade models are based on comparative advantage. Arguing that if 
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not controlled for it, gravity equations model would underestimate trade flows for 
pairs like Australia and New Zealand, which they are far apart but much closer 
compared to other trade partners. It would overestimate others like Germany and the 
Netherlands, almost picking-out the euro effect, which they have much more trade 
partners around. 
Notwithstanding, most of misspecification issues coming from omission of certain 
variables or their form can be simply solved using panel data techniques as it was 
suggested in the gold medal mistake solution. 
Sample issues 
The sample gathered by (Rose, 2000) was unbalanced (includes missing values) and 
with many zero values for trade, which had to be discarded in order to use natural 
logarithms. Previously we highlighted that most of currency union observation are 
hub-and-spoke type, resulting in lot of zero values for spoke-and-spoke CUs. Therefore, 
as (Baldwin, 2006) comments, this leads to an upward bias on the CU coefficient 
because it does not take into account this zero values. A possible solution that I 
suggest, I ignore myself if it is econometrically correct to implement, is to allot a zero 
value on their logarithm to those observation so the regression analysis can take them 
into account. 
Even if we were to assume that the results do not suffer from any of these problems, 
even if the conclusions reached in (Rose, 2000) were undoubtedly perfect, they could 
not be extrapolated to the EMU. Several reasons concerning the sample turned them 
likely to be biased. 
First, several authors like (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003)  and (Berger & Nitsch, 2005)  
highlight that most currency union are among small, poor and very open economies, or 
between them and a much bigger country. On the contrary, European countries are 
much larger and developed; hence Rose results would apply just to those CUs that are 
similar to those in the sample. 
Second, articles written by (Estevadeoral, Frantz, & Taylor, 2002) and (Lopez-Cordova 
& Meissner, 2002), though being based in pre-Second World War era and the gold 
standard, could be more comparable since they are based on industrial and developing 
countries. They found out that the gold standard boosted trade between 34% and 
72%. 
Finally, if we look deeper into the data we observe that most of currency unions shifts 
are about countries breaking up their common monetary policy, and not entering into 
a common currency. Thus the fact that Rose effect is that high is that split-ups are 
much more trade destroyers than union are boosters. This is addressed by (Glick & 
Rose, 2001) when analyzing the sensitivity of their model, they conclude that they 
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cannot reject equality of entry and exit impact of trade (with opposite coefficient sign 
of course). This concern it is also searched in (Nitsch, 2005) where he finds out that 
entries and exits are a different issue and the effect in the entry case is heterogeneous 
(CFA area versus others). 
2.3 Updates of Rose model 
After the first round of critics arose, Rose, together with other colleagues, approaches 
these concerns and tries to solve them. 
Some months after (Rose, 2000), they published (Rose & van Wincoop, 2001) where 
the main point was to introduce in the Rose model country fix-effect. This method 
drops the Rose effect from 297% to 136% with data from 1970 to 1995 for almost 200 
countries. Second they also put in place the multilateral resistance term that 
(Anderson & van Wincoop, 2001) developed. With data from 1980 to 1990 for 143 
countries they predict the effect of the euro to be about 58% of increasing trade and 
11% in welfare. 
(Glick & Rose, 2001) expanded the data set, catching 217 countries from 1948 to 1997. 
In my view this could be dangerous, as they take into account currency unions under 
colonial empires, thus introducing more break-ups in the regression, some of them 
with wars involved hereunder. In contrast with other papers, he uses country-pair 
within estimator methodology which drops the Rose effect from 267% to 91%. They do 
also separate country exit from entries, as I have already said above, finding it 
impossible to accept that they have the same effect on trade. In this latter point they 
introduce the Ireland-UK case study, finding no trade break-up at all the data for this 
specific case, being an exception and not the rule for other currency split-ups. 
2.4 Own concerns 
After reading all this articles I got to mind several more concerns that I would like to 
raise. I have previously discussed how lots of currency unions were between small 
poor countries and there were more split-ups than new formations. My first point goes 
in this line too. The so called hub-and-spoke currency union might be biased because 
some of the spokes (tiny countries) contain military bases that might increase trade 
systematically, whilst other where there are no military facilities do not. This can be 
either through military material, if accounted as trade in the statistics, or by products 
from homeland that the troops and personnel are used to consume, let’s say as a 
major example the Coca-cola! Examples like this that I found easily are US and 
Panama, UK and Gibraltar or France and French Polynesia. Yet other countries that are 
not in a CU do also contain military bases, but these are relatively much larger than 
these spokes and thus the effect on trade is almost negligible. 
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Another point that should have been controlled for in the (Glick & Rose, 2001) 
extended paper is the fact that some break-ups happened after a colonial war, like 
France and Algeria or Portugal and its colonies. Damaging trade even further. 
Second the data measurement way, using and averaging FOB and CIF might be an easy 
way out. I think one of it should be selected based on theory/literature ideally or 
assumed for convenience, but averaging introduces systematic upward bias for 
countries far apart, difficult transportation, or political shakiness. 
Last but not least none of the studies have compared results between time-invariant 
country-pair fix effects and time-varying country dummies. It would be interesting to 
do so as a robustness check of the model. 
To sum up this part, Rose first found result of 235% has been dropped to a range of 
90% to 140% depending the author and specification used in each case. Remember 
that this figure cannot be directly turned to the euro as sample characteristic are 
different, but it remains large and significant to be ignored. 
3. Eurozone specific literature 
In this section I will review three articles I consider to be important and then just 
comment some other issues about euroland arisen in other papers. 
3.1 Micco, Stein & Ordoñez (2003) 
It is one of the first studies analyzing the Rose effect with eurozone countries’ figures. 
For this purpose they gather data from 1992 to 20023 in dollar terms of total goods 
trade (as imports plus exports), using two different samples. First and bigger, 22 
developed countries. Second and cozier, the 14 members4 of European Union (EU) that 
has the advantage to be a group much homogenous with all of them inside the EU. 
They use natural logarithms for trade, GDP distance and GDP per capita. 
In the debate of choosing nominal or real GDP figures, though preferring the latter, 
they present the results with both of them. They argue for real ones that “since large 
shifts in real exchange rates around the time of the creation of the EMU may cause the 
results to be sensitive to changes in the definition of this variables”, but as the answer 
to it is not obvious they include both. Besides, they say that the estimation from 
nominal output would be an upper bound and the real a lower bound of the euro 
effect. In the latter estimation they will control for real exchange rates too, one for the 
exporter and the other for the importer against the dollar. 
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 They warn that 2002 data is the result of annualizing trade data until July 2002. They find it 
convenience to include given the amount of years since the euro was in action. 
4
 Belgium and Luxemburg share the custom system. 
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Despite their preferred specification for the model is using country-pair fix effects 
together with year dummies, they do also present the result of the pooled OLS 
including trade barriers such as distance, landlocked, language, island, area and 
border. In the developed sample the euro effect goes from 32% in nominal OLS to 4% 
in real no-FOREX5 fix-effects. While the EU15 sample the range goes from 37% to 6% 
for the same specifications respectively. 
Thereafter, they alter the specification in order to analyze the euro timing effect. For 
this purpose they drop the euro and year dummies from the model and they include a 
time trend for those countries that will adopt the euro in 19996. In this year the effect 
is positive and significant for both samples. However, the real jump comes in 1998, 
one year before the EMU was finally settled. Another jump comes in 2001. As possible 
explanations about why does the effect appear a year earlier they argue that it was not 
until that year when every doubt of the euro formation was gone7. (Frankel, 2008) also 
support the view that until March 1998 the euro was still in the air. Adding that 
financial market statistics point to June 1997 as the break-up, implied from the interest 
swap market, but as financial markets react faster than goods and services one the 
effect can be lagged to the year after in 1998. (Flam & Nordström, 2003) also suggest 
that currency hedging is a short term strategy, and then it was easy to hedge exchange 
rate risk for the remainder months of 1998. 
Another question that (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) raise in their paper is the euro 
triggered any trade diversion from non-eurozone to eurozone countries. They do it 
introducing to their first model a new dummy (EMU1) that takes value 1 when just one 
of the countries in the pair belongs to the eurozone, so if there is any trade diversion it 
should take a negative value the dummy coefficient. Nonetheless, depending on the 
sample and compared to trade among non-eurozone countries, trade between 
eurozone and non-eurozone countries increases from 12% in the full sample to not 
significant from zero in the reduced sample. As possible explanations they suggest that 
the euro directly reduced the exchange rate risk with other currencies, especially for 
small countries. Indirectly it is easier and cheaper to hedge those remaining risks. And 
they argue that the non-significance of the EU subsample is normal due to the small 
sample variation among non-euro countries.  
Then they remake the euro timing model including trade diversion dummy, founding it 
to be positive and significant in 1998 as well for the extended sample. (Gomes, 
Graham, Helliwell, Kano, Murray, & Schembri, 2006) comment that the absence of 
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 of March of 1998 the European Commission and the European Monetary Institute published 
their convergence reports suggesting that 11 countries should be admitted in the euro. In May the 
decision was announced during the meeting of the Heads of States in Brussels. And in June the 
European Central Bank (ECB) was created. 
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trade diversion may not be relevant due to the fact that it is not controlled for the 
effect of increased trade with China and Eastern European countries. 
Finally they run some robustness checks excluding one euro-member country each 
time, specific EMU country dummy and by groups of countries8. They found out that 
the euro seem to be more boosting for the Netherlands and Spain, whilst less for 
Greece, for which alone the estimation turn to be negative and significant. By groups is 
more beneficial for the core Europe rather than the periphery. 
3.2 Berger & Nitsch (2005) 
The following article, published some years after (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003), 
comments some of their conclusions and tries to clarify them. They find suspicious 
about it that within the full sample membership in the EU have just a bit larger effect 
on trade than EMU membership, especially considering the few years since it was 
launched. They do not agree either of the reasons behind the arisen of the euro effect 
in 1998, one year earlier. As last point they raise a question on why do the DM block 
concentrates most of the euro effect, suggesting that positive effect may take time 
until countries converge. 
They first start reproducing (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003)9, preferring as they do the 
country-pair fix effect specification, but adding the pooled OLS for completeness. Then 
they update the data set with their new definition for variables and uses complete 
2002 data for trade10. In the second update they extend to 2003 trade data. These 
actualizations increased estimation to about 15% from 5%.  
Next step was to extend the time period back to 1948. The results vary from 41% of 
the full sample to 55% of the European sample. However these figures absorb at least 
part of the European integration effect on trade and not only the euro effect. To 
control for it the authors run several regression to capture the trade intensity of EMU 
members in short periods of time, one for each decade. It comes to prove the positive 
trend of increasing European trade over time in comparison to non-eurozone 
members.  
Finally, after controlling for exchange rate volatility they construct an integration 
index. This index tries to capture the fact that European integration has been an 
ongoing process with year of rapid integrations with other époques of standstill. It is 
calculated as an average from three measures one in each period11, in the end of each 
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 The groups are the less developed ones (Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece), European 1956 
(Benelux, Germany, France and Italy), Nordics (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Finland) and 
Deustche Mark (DM) block (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France and Austria). 
9
 The only change in the remake was to drop two insignificant variables (land area and EU trend). 
10
 Remember that (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) annualized 2002 from the first semester of data 
that they had available. 
11
 Periods are 1948-60, 1961-92 and 1993-2003. 
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period the index takes the maximum value of the measure if not reached before. First 
it’s the share of products free from quantitative restrictions, second the average tariff 
index and last the Internal Market Index12. 
The graph below shows the evolution of this index. We can observe the standstill 
period in European integration between 1980 and 1992. Besides it distinguishes 
between eurozone member states and those outside the euro. When the index, scaled 
down from a 30 points maximum to 10, is added to the gravity equation, it is positive 
and significant but it does not really affect euro dummy coefficient value to much. It 
goes down from 34% to 32% in the full sample and from 48% to 45% in the reduced 
sample. As a last attempt to reduce the coefficient they induce a time trend for euro 
countries, this captures every dummy effect becoming insignificant. Concluding that 
the euro is a step further in European integration rather than a one-time trade gain. 
 
Source: (Berger & Nitsch, 2005)  
3.3 Frankel (2008) 
In this paper, he first reproduces (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) euro timing research 
and effectively he confirms that the euro effect first arise in 1998, as I have already 
mentioned before. Then he enlarges the sample with four extra years till 2006. 
Interestingly, he discovered that the positive effect is an upward trend which stops 
during 2005 and 2006. 
Next step he performs is to enlarge the sample including other CUs different from the 
euro and to reach back until using data from 1948. This part is quite confusing, to 
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many countries and years mixed with a various of different specification and results. 
He discovered that country size reduces the effect of the currency union on trade, but 
that the whole sample including small countries arise lot of noise in the model and a 
mix of results. The problems increase when he expanded the sample to the 1948-2006 
period. 
He does also try to control for lagged effect of currency unions on trade. He shows that 
effect seems to be important during first years and then it is reduced over time until it 
is gone in 10 years time. Anyway, to focus, most specifications (similar sample ones) 
point the effect of the euro in trade to be from 10% to 25%, in line with other authors. 
3.4 Other euro-specific points and problems 
In (Baldwin, 2006) is said that (Flam & Nordström, 2003) is the best paper up-to-date 
ever. He specially highlights the fact that it does not commit any medal mistake and it 
uses direction specific trade flow instead of averaging of summing exports and 
imports. They found the Rose effect to be 15% and 8% in the reduced sample. When 
distinguishing the trade diversion effect between exports and imports they found that 
the euro seems to boost Eurozone imports but it is insignificant for exports. 
Some authors suggest a more complex way to approach the euro timing. Actually is 
(Bun & Klaassen, 2002) who address the problem with dynamic panel data techniques 
getting 4% of short-term effect and 40% in the long-run. However, (Gomes, Graham, 
Helliwell, Kano, Murray, & Schembri, 2006) are worried that lagged variables in the 
gravity equation may not fit the theory of the model. Adding that its significance could 
be spurious due to increasing trade in intermediate good around these years, 
remembering us that GDP is measured in value added units whilst trade is done in 
absolute value.  
On spurious results does also focus (Baldwin, 2006). Making him suspicious about it 
the speed that the euro effect shows up and the absence of trade diversion. He 
presents as possible hypotheses for it the VAT13 frauds on exports14, euro depreciation 
the years after introduced and the implementation of Internal Market measures. 
(Gomes, Graham, Helliwell, Kano, Murray, & Schembri, 2006) push concerns on 
endogeneity problems. They saw three groups within the EU with different 
commitments to it, the core always committed because their closeness which give 
them the larger gains for integration; the periphery that want to reach core-Europe’s 
life standards; and non-eurozone members which neither will benefit from integration 
as much as the core nor to approximate their life-standards since they already have 
them. (Barr, Breedon, & Miles, 2003) use output and price co-movements to explain 
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 It has been a growing gap between reported exports and imports for intra-EU trade since the tax 
authorities are the ones responsible to gather the data instead of the customs authorities. 
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eurozone membership through instrumental variable techniques, getting 21% increase 
on the euro effect coefficient. 
Another issue with minimum effect, if country-pair fix effect are used, is the so called 
Rotterdam effect. Through this port in the Netherlands, and also through Antwerp 
(Belgium), enter many of European imports from outside Europe. The problem arises 
because in 1993 happened the change in the export/import accounting method. 
Before this year, imports were accounted as that in the final country of destination, 
while now a substantial amount is recorded as imports from the rest of the world to 
Netherlands or Belgium and from them as exports to the final destination state. These 
concerns have been tried to be solved by (Gomes, Graham, Helliwell, Kano, Murray, & 
Schembri, 2006). 
Finally, there are other sort of papers that instead of using country-level data they try 
to solve the question looking at sector-level figures. Examples of it are (Flam & 
Nordström, 2003) and (Baldwin, Skudelny, & Taglioni, 2005). I found an article by 
(Fontagne, Mayer, & Ottaviano, 2009) that approaches it with firm-level data. Yet I did 
not look further into them as my paper is based in country-level data. 
Therefore to sum this section, studies focused on the euro specifically found in general 
the Rose effect to be from about 5% to 35% depending on the model specification and 
the econometric methodology used. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data 
In total I used 18 years, from 1993 to 2010 for 26 different countries15. Two samples 
will be developed, the full one and the reduced one using EU-15 countries. All these 
makes 10,752 observations for the full sample and 3,264 for the reduced one. A 
description of each variable follows this paragraph. 
Trade data has been taken from Eurostat database. It represents trade flows in euros16 
from 1993 to 2010, which was the year when the trade records were started to be 
reported by the tax authorities instead by the customs ones. The classification system 
used is the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). The data is double 
reported by country of origin and destination. As long as exports tend to be overstated 
due to the VAT fraud, import destination data source is the one been used17. Missing 
values will be dropped from the sample18; they are most concentrated in 1993 and 
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 Belgium and Luxemburg are considered as one. 
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 At current exchange rates, yearly average. Before euro is reported in ECUs. 
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 Some missing values that were reported by export origin nation were introduces to fill that gap. 
There are a total of 1002 from 11,700 observations. 
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 There are a total of 948 from 11,700 observations. 
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1994, and till 1998 for Eastern countries19. This might produce an upward biased in the 
results that we must be aware of. It has been then deflated with the euro HICP20 and 
then transformed into natural logarithms. 
GDP data is taken from Eurostat at market price in current euros from 1993 to 2010. 
Data for Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania 
for years 1993 and 1994 is missing, so it was taken from United Nations Statistical 
Division database at market prices in current US dollar and converted into current 
euros with the USD-EUR average quotation for each year in the Eurostat database. It 
has been then deflated with the euro HICP and then transformed into natural 
logarithms. 
GDP per capita was obtained with the real GDP figure as described in previous 
paragraph and dividing between average population data from Eurostat, for year 2010 
population on the 1st of January was used as the average population figures were 
missing. I believe average figures to be more realistic if dramatic population changes 
happened during the period. 
Real Exchange Rates (RER) for each country against the euro are taken from the 
Eurostat, which label them as Real Effective Exchange Rate (deflator: consumer price 
indices - 16 trading partners - Euro Area). Base year 1999. Data for years 1993 and 
2010 is missing, so when using this variable these years will be dropped from the 
sample. 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) variable is a dummy that takes value 1 when both 
countries in the pair have signed a FTA. If both members are inside EU it will take value 
0 as there is a specific variable for it. It covers several agreements between initially 
non-EU countries and EU (called Europe Agreement, EA), and both non-EU like Central 
European FTA (CEFTA), Baltic FTA (BAFTA), European Economic Area (EEA) or 
agreements between European FTA (EFTA) and other countries. All these agreements 
disappeared when they entered in the EU. See Appendix for more detailed data. 
Wikipedia and the web of the EFTA21 has been the source for this part. 
European Union (EU) dummy takes value 1 when both parties are within the EU and 0 
otherwise. EMU have three types, EMU2 if both are within the EMU, EMU1 if one is 
and one not, EMU1222 if just the destination country is and EMU21 if the origin nation 
is. See Appendix for more detailed data. 
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EU Trend is a trend variable that measures the amount of years each country-pair has 
been within the EU for each year, starting in 1993. For instance, Portugal-UK in 2010 
they have been 18 years, from 1993 to 2010; while Sweden-Cyprus in 2005 they have 
been 2 years from 2004 to 2005. EMU Trend behaves similarly, but when both are 
inside EMU, and zero if not. EMU-year dummies are a group of year dummies that 
takes value 1 for that year if the country-pair started in the euro in 1999; it does the 
same as EMU2-year in (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003). 
Distance variable is gathered from CEPII. It measures the distance between each pair 
of countries demographic center. This center is an arithmetic weighted average of 
country’s main cities. (Berger & Nitsch, 2005) specifically state that their distance 
variable is between geographical centers, and (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) do not 
specify on it, but most sure that they do also. However, I believe distance between 
demographic centers23 reflect a more realistic picture between two countries rather 
than distance between geographical centers. For example imagine a country pair like 
Finland and Estonia, they are near each other but Finland’s geographic center is much 
upper north than were population and economic activity is located, thus trade 
between them would be underestimated by the model. On the contrary, France and 
Portugal trade would be systematically overestimated because France’s economic 
activity and population is more concentrated in the north. It has been used in natural 
logarithms. 
Language pairs are Austria-Germany, Belgium-Netherlands, Belgium-France, UK-
Ireland-Cyprus-Malta, Cyprus-Greece, Denmark-Sweden (due to understandability), 
Sweden-Finland (substantial Swedish mother tongue community), Estonia-Latvia-
Lithuania (substantial Russian mother tongue community), Hungary-Slovakia 
(substantial Hungarian mother tongue community) and Hungary-Romania (substantial 
Hungarian mother tongue community). Border is a dummy if they share a common 
border, islands takes 1 if one country is an island or 2 if both. Landlocked takes 1 if one 
country is landlocked or 2 if both. Transited is a dummy that takes value 1 if one 
country was a former socialist-communist country and 2 if both Wikipedia and Google 
Maps has been the source. 
Brent Crude Oil prices measure the yearly average quotation in current euros at 
constant price. Brent prices were taken from EIA24, converted into current euros with 
average USD-EUR quotation from Eurostat and deflated with the HICP. Then revalued 
at 100 points for 1993 and converted into natural logarithms. 
A descriptive statistics table can be found in the Appendix. Also some correlation table 
and chart for GDP real growth. 
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 US Energy Information Administration. 




The analysis will be based in the gravity equation. It extrapolates to the economy of 
trade the physic equation that states that the gravity between two objects is equal to 
the gravitational constant times both objects’ mass divided by the distance between 
them. It was firstly developed by (Linnemmann, 1966) and it has been widely 
extended, tested and used for other researches like this thesis. 
The main specification is a similar one that the one that (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 
2003) develop. I will use real figures for GDP and GDP per capita, drop country area, 
and add transitional for the full sample. 
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Where  is the intercept, GDP is each country GDP for origin o or destination d 
nation25, ycap is country’s GDP per capita, control variables include language, distance, 
border,… and last γ represent year dummies. The key parameter is then δ. Later real 
exchange rates will be also included. 
However, my preferred specification as other authors is the one that include country-
pair fix effects. They will be direction specific. I have tried to take into account as much 
as possible learnt in the literature, especially the one concerned to the medal mistakes 
including direction specific flows, time dummies and fix-effects. 
5. Results 
This section will have first some replications with my data of previous models that have been 
tried by some authors. 
5.1 MSO26 (2003) replication 
First thing to be done with the data is to replicate MSO specification for EU-15 
subsample and compare the results. For this purpose I transform trade variable to 
reflect bilateral trade flow, instead of direction specific flow27. GDP and GDP per capita 
variables have been multiplied28.  
In spite of trying to replicate the first model as comparable as possible, some 
differences still are present. My regression has one year less of data, from 1993 to 
2002 versus 1992 to 2002. I do not include area variable as it is not significant, while I 
do include island one, which I do not know why but it is not present on MSO. 
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Then there are some differences in measuring GDP and trade variables as well. MSO 
real GDP is calculated increasing the first year figure by the real growth rate reported 
on the IMF. Whereas trade is an average between booth country reporters data of 
both their imports and exports. Another issue is on distance, which MSO does not 
specifically explain how it is obtained. 
After this clarification the table hereunder reports the results. We can see that there is 
some variation in some coefficients, especially in output per capita one which is 
positive in MSO and negative in my replication in the pooled OLS specification. It can 
be due to my reduced sample or the way GDP is computed. Theory tells us that richer 
countries trade more due to trade in intermediate inputs and intra-industry trade. 
Comparative with Micco, Stein & Ordoñez (2003) results 
lnTrade MSO (2003), 1992-2002 Replication, 1993-2002 
lnGDP 0.775*** 2.979*** 0.787*** 3.072** 
 (0.014) (0.552) (0.0281) (0.931) 
lnYcap 0.201*** -2.357*** -0.268** -2.716** 
 (0.037) (0.595) (0.0954) (0.952) 
EU -0.029 0.030 -0.151* 0.0272 
 (0.24) (0.035) (0.0595) (0.0329) 
EU Trend -0.047 0.017 -0.151** 0.00971 
 (0.084) (0.072) (0.0557) (0.00715) 
FTA -0.026 -0.014 -0.144* 0.0188 
 (0.132) (0.026) (0.0563) (0.0206) 
lnDistance -0.760***  -1.252***  
 (0.037)  (0.103)  
Language 0.779***  0.387*  
 (0.108)  (0.179)  
Border 0.413***  0.0638  
 (0.063)  (0.109)  
Area -0.019    
 (0.015)    
Island   0.0194  
   (0.0649)  
Landlocked -0.012  -0.785***  
 (0.057)  (0.124)  
EMU2 0.191*** 0.059*** 0.0984*** 0.0796** 
 (0.048) (0.014) (0.0266) (0.0241) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
N 1001 1001 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
When comparing EMU2 results it is rapid highlighted that OLS MSO’s coefficient is 
much larger than the replication one, while that difference is much lower in the fix-
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effects specification. Therefore this divergence is caused by some time-invariant 
variable. Area and island are both non-significant. Others are objectively measured, 
but it is distance the one where there might be differences in measuring it. As it is 
specified in the Data section, there might be a difference that is we analyze it deeply it 
seems to be not random as far as I am concerned. The three non-euro countries in the 
EU-1529 has a demographic center more in the south and nearer to Europe’s economic 
core30, while for the other EU countries it is more random (biggest differences are in 
France, Italy and Finland which demographic centers are closer too and the other way 
round happens with Austria and Greece). 
Another issue is that the replication coefficient is more stable when introducing the fix-
effects specification, but once again it can be due to all the reasons mentioned above. 
Nonetheless, what does it really matter is that all EMU2 coefficients are positive and 
significant on a range of 6% to 20%, and in line with other studies. 
5.2 Full sample and EU-15 expanded until 2010 
In the following two tables we can see two main specifications for both sample, full 
and EU-15. First is the pooled OLS and then the within estimator model. Besides in the 
full sample in it a middle step without transition variable, which is negative and 
significant as these economies needed to adapt their productive structures to market 
driven economy. Everything is also done for the extended period of time until 2010. 
First thing that was suspicious is why the full EMU2 coefficient does fall from OLS to 
FE31, in contrast to what other authors found and that what happens in the EU-15 
subsample. So that is why I introduced this middle step without transition, yet EMU2 
coefficient does not change but so does others like output and per capita ones (still not 
statistically significant change). This is logical since transition economies are on 
average smaller and poorer economies than the others. Economically thinking these 
new EU members must have some common unknown feature that makes EMU2 
coefficient be biased because of an omitted variable unlike it happens in the 
developed countries sample. 
Another interesting point is the negative coefficient for the EU Trend, stable 
throughout all full sample specifications. It means that the EU membership benefits 
are diluted over time, disappearing in 5 years time. But as long as this is a result of 
intra-EU trade we must be precautious to extract a conclusion. Therefore I would say it 
is the result of a greater Europe integration and trade liberalization that happened 
before the new members entered the EU. Maybe due to the fact that the business 
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world new they were going to get in establishing thus business relationship before 
their formal membership came true. 
Focus in our main objective again, the effect of the euro goes in the full sample from 
8% to 11% in boosting trade among its members. It quite stable and in line with other 
studies up-to-date. 
Full sample       
lnTrade 1993-2002 1993-2010 
lnGDPo 0.926*** 0.938*** -1.940* 0.923*** 0.941*** 0.308 
 (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.874) (0.0223) (0.0230) (0.476) 
lnGDPd 0.818*** 0.830*** -1.713# 0.817*** 0.836*** -0.414 
 (0.0259) (0.0270) (0.882) (0.0231) (0.0247) (0.388) 
lnYcapo -0.0393 0.0212 2.578** -0.0841 -0.0543 0.432 
 (0.0782) (0.0609) (0.864) (0.0592) (0.0544) (0.462) 
lnYcapd 0.0504 0.111* 2.599** 0.0585 0.0882 1.250*** 
 (0.0656) (0.0493) (0.840) (0.0545) (0.0494) (0.374) 
EU 0.0875* 0.112** -0.00740 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0394) (0.0389) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0378) 
EU Trend -0.0290*** -0.0243*** -0.0272** -0.0373*** -0.0320*** -0.0374*** 
 (0.00782) (0.00703) (0.00836) (0.00583) (0.00487) (0.00657) 
FTA 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.0752* 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0317) (0.0337) (0.0340) (0.0331) 
lnDistance -1.601*** -1.524***  -1.589*** -1.516***  
 (0.0776) (0.0683)  (0.0685) (0.0624)  
Language 0.905*** 0.936***  0.969*** 1.000***  
 (0.159) (0.154)  (0.155) (0.148)  
Border -0.0933 -0.0438  -0.0575 -0.00799  
 (0.117) (0.114)  (0.110) (0.105)  
Island -0.160* -0.0921  -0.186** -0.105  
 (0.0681) (0.0675)  (0.0649) (0.0640)  
Landlocked -0.141* -0.181**  -0.0932 -0.136*  
 (0.0651) (0.0629)  (0.0594) (0.0568)  
Transition -0.274*   -0.249**   
 (0.132)   (0.0893)   
EMU2 0.0938*** 0.0927*** 0.103*** 0.0816** 0.0801** 0.104*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0277) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
N 5552 5552 5552 10752 10752 10752 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
Next we now compare it to the EU-15 subsample, between really similar countries. 
Here we might ignore EU, EU Trend and FTA since their variation is almost gone. Still is 
worthy to comment that there was something going on in 1993 in the trade between 
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non-EU countries at that time32 and the others. Both EU and FTA dummies are 
negative and significant, but I totally ignore what can be the reason for that. Distance 
change when expanding the sample to 2010 is significant, hence something happened 
that made far long countries to decrease its trade, one possible explanation might be 
that transporting cost increased at that period, especially oil prices a major 
commodity. Again EMU2 coefficient is positive and significant on a similar range from 
9% to 12%. 
EU-15 subsample    
lnTrade 1993-2002 1993-2010 
lnGDPo 0.765*** 2.817** 0.751*** 1.154* 
 (0.0349) (1.037) (0.0365) (0.495) 
lnGDPd 0.863*** 2.851** 0.824*** 0.0924 
 (0.0391) (1.006) (0.0388) (0.493) 
lnYcapo -0.274* -2.542* -0.419*** -0.933 
 (0.113) (1.053) (0.114) (0.503) 
lnYcapd -0.293*** -2.354* -0.368*** 0.488 
 (0.0858) (1.065) (0.0824) (0.526) 
EU -0.208*** 0.00731 -0.218*** 0.0101 
 (0.0592) (0.0304) (0.0615) (0.0353) 
EU Trend -0.190*** 0.0101# -0.224*** 0.00741# 
 (0.0556) (0.00550) (0.0561) (0.00377) 
FTA -0.196*** 0.00600 -0.225*** 0.00608 
 (0.0577) (0.0184) (0.0579) (0.0180) 
lnDistance -1.323***  -1.476***  
 (0.102)  (0.109)  
Language 0.385*  0.316#  
 (0.160)  (0.166)  
Border 0.0356  0.0273  
 (0.117)  (0.116)  
Island 0.00455  -0.0442  
 (0.0783)  (0.0809)  
Landlocked -0.803***  -0.833***  
 (0.114)  (0.120)  
EMU2 0.103*** 0.0868*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0282) (0.0284) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
N 1808 1808 3264 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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5.3 Real exchange rates 
There is not much to comment here. Theory tells us that real exchange rates (RER) do 
affect trade since when they change they make one country products relatively more 
expensive those other ones’. In MSO we saw that they were significant, (Baldwin, 
2006) per contra does not like them pretty much. So as a normal check I include them 
know and see how does the picture change.  
As we can observe they are mainly insignificant and unstable, maybe due to different 
computing methods for output figures or maybe due to that their effect is tiny is the 
short-run. Nowadays there is a wide variety of products and vertical international 
specialization, this links change slowly over time and cannot change every time 
exchange rates trend changes. Besides consumer products controlled by 
multinationals have a price policy that does not reflect perfectly exchange rates 
movements. 
So I have decided not to give more importance to it and exclude RER from next 
specification. You can see the result in the Appendix. 
5.4 Analyzing trade diversion  
As MSO did, I include EMU1 in the model, it switches on when there is in the pair a 
country inside the euro and the other is not. Similarly to MSO he found that the effect 
is positive, boosting trade about 13%, so that there is no trade diversion. Theory tells 
us that when we lower trade barriers between two countries those countries tend to 
trade relatively more with them reducing trade with other partners. Thus, if the euro 
lowers barriers we should see this coefficient be negative instead as it is positive.  
However, seeing the result it is arguable that within Europe there plenty of small 
countries, whose currencies are difficult to trade with others. With the euro in place 
now, trade between small countries like Portugal and Latvia is easier and cheaper as 
one country in the pair owns a strong currency. This could explain the positive 
coefficient found in the full sample and the not significant coefficient in the EU-15 
subsample as the non-euro ones are not that small. Other plausible explanation for the 
latter finding rest in the econometrics, there little variation for the control group33 and 
especially EMU2 and EMU1 suffer from multicollinearity. It can be seen in the standard 
error for those coefficient with the one without EMU1, it rises for EMU2 from about 
0.022-0.028 to 0.038-0.063, almost doubling depending the specification. This increase 
is the reason why EMU2 coefficient is insignificant for the EU-15 period 1993-2010. 
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Trade diversion effect (EMU1)    
 Full sample EU-15 subsample 
lnTrade 1993-2002 1993-2010 1993-2002 1993-2010 
lnGDPo 0.921*** -1.986* 0.227 0.764*** 2.792** 1.155* 
 (0.0238) (0.873) (0.470) (0.0349) (1.036) (0.495) 
lnGDPd 0.814*** -1.760* -0.496 0.863*** 2.826** 0.0928 
 (0.0257) (0.873) (0.381) (0.0390) (1.004) (0.494) 
lnYcapo -0.0310 2.628** 0.496 -0.272* -2.515* -0.933# 
 (0.0781) (0.864) (0.456) (0.113) (1.052) (0.504) 
lnYcapd 0.0586 2.649** 1.315*** -0.291*** -2.327* 0.487 
 (0.0653) (0.831) (0.368) (0.0857) (1.063) (0.526) 
EU 0.0954* -0.00479 0.142*** -0.207*** 0.00475 0.0103 
 (0.0393) (0.0363) (0.0373) (0.0592) (0.0302) (0.0355) 
EU Trend -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.040*** -0.190*** 0.0073 0.0077 
 (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0556) (0.0065) (0.0051) 
FTA 0.150*** 0.0737* 0.110*** -0.196*** 0.00314 0.00635 
 (0.0360) (0.0317) (0.0327) (0.0577) (0.0188) (0.0185) 
lnDistance -1.609***   -1.322***  
 (0.0771)   (0.102)  
Language 0.909***   0.386*  
 (0.159)   (0.160)  
Border -0.0888   0.0366  
 (0.117)   (0.117)  
Island -0.139*   0.00517  
 (0.0691)   (0.0782)  
Landlocked -0.147*   -0.804***  
 (0.0651)   (0.114)  
Transition -0.227#     
 (0.132)     
EMU2 0.196*** 0.211*** 0.234*** 0.137*** 0.112** 0.109 
 (0.0382) (0.0397) (0.0420) (0.0391) (0.0378) (0.0634) 
EMU1 0.119** 0.125** 0.141*** 0.0384 0.0279 -0.00498 
 (0.0368) (0.0387) (0.0370) (0.0399) (0.0380) (0.0652) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
N 5552 5552 10752 1808 1808 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
 
More in depth look, we see when splitting the control group from at least one non-
EMU country to both must be non-EMU, the euro effect or EMU2 rises till 22%. Hence 
not only euro increases trade within members comparing to a non-members but the 
difference is even more dramatic comparing to trade between non-euro countries. The 
EMU1 coefficient is about the same size in the MSO full sample (12%) that includes 
other world major economies and in my full sample that include other European 
countries (13%). 
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Another way to approach this problem is to use our direction specific data to 
distinguish Euroarea exports from imports. So it was also done by (Flam & Nordström, 
2003). I found that EMU12 and EMU21 are not significantly different from each other, 
as you can see in the next table in columns 1, 5 and 6.  
Direction specific trade diversion (1993-2010)   
lnTrade Full sample EU-15 
lnGDPo 0.920*** 0.339 0.517 0.493 0.749*** 1.126* 
 (0.0222) (0.469) (0.463) (0.472) (0.0363) (0.502) 
lnGDPd 0.813*** -0.606 -0.410 -0.400 0.826*** 0.122 
 (0.0235) (0.384) (0.371) (0.379) (0.0387) (0.492) 
lnYcapo -0.0912 0.373 0.181 0.206 -0.418*** -0.904 
 (0.0585) (0.457) (0.450) (0.460) (0.114) (0.511) 
lnYcapd 0.0566 1.437*** 1.225*** 1.214*** -0.369*** 0.458 
 (0.0551) (0.372) (0.358) (0.366) (0.0819) (0.525) 
EU 0.164*** 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.140*** -0.218*** 0.0103 
 (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0615) (0.0355) 
EU Trend -0.0391*** -0.0399*** -0.0329*** -0.0332*** -0.224*** 0.00768 
 (0.00592) (0.00664) (0.00712) (0.00651) (0.0564) (0.00506) 
FTA 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.0973** 0.0976** -0.225*** 0.00635 
 (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0582) (0.0184) 
lnDistance -1.608***    -1.475***  
 (0.0693)    (0.109)  
Language 0.975***    0.316  
 (0.156)    (0.167)  
Border -0.0611    0.0271  
 (0.110)    (0.116)  
Island -0.168*    -0.0443  
 (0.0660)    (0.0809)  
Landlocked -0.0981    -0.833***  
 (0.0597)    (0.120)  
Transition -0.231**      
 (0.0891)      
EMU2 0.191*** 0.234*** 0.155** 0.161*** 0.111 0.109 
 (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0483) (0.0301) (0.0617) (0.0629) 
Tran*EMU21   0.171** 0.126***   
   (0.0551) (0.0331)   
EMU21 0.116** 0.0991* -0.0561  0.0185 0.0148 
 (0.0400) (0.0408) (0.0658)  (0.0659) (0.0677) 
Tran*EMU12   0.150* 0.188***   
   (0.0617) (0.0391)   
EMU12 0.126** 0.183*** 0.0411  -0.0266 -0.0247 
 (0.0437) (0.0468) (0.0741)  (0.0674) (0.0694) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 3264 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
 
  Joseba Matanza 
29 
 
However, when fix-effects are applied into the full sample there is a change that does 
not happen in the reduced subsample. It is that now both coefficients are different and 
go in line with (Flam & Nordström, 2003) that concluded that the euro seemed to turn 
the euro nations as a greater importers (20% versus 10% for euro exports). Still is 
suspicious why this does not appear in the EU-15 sample. When thinking for reasons 
that could explain it globalization came first with the vertical specialization networks. 
At this time multinational presence in Eastern Europe grew and these factories were to 
export many of their products as inputs to Western European companies or as final 
products, this could explain this direction specific difference. 
Afterward I crossed EMU12 and EMU21 dummies with transition one, so if my thinking 
was sound these coefficient should take strong value and make disappear the non-
crossed coefficient ones. That can be seen in column 3 and 4, the latter excludes the 
non-crossed dummies since they are insignificant. Despite their difference (20% versus 
13% for euro exports) they are not statistically significant. Another conclusion that can 
be reached is that there is no trade diversion arising from the euro, rather the opposite 
for some group of countries. 
5.5 Timing the euro 
Last comparison is the euro timing effect. This specification was developed by MSO in 
order to observe if the euro effect appears when it should in 1999. He found as you 
might already have read that it appeared a year earlier. Each EMU-year variable is a 
dummy that takes one for that specific year if both countries are entering the euro in 
1999. 
Under my data I found also that it appears in 1998 in the full sample. Then it grows 
further in 1999 being more or less stable around 20% and decreasing when the 
financial crisis hit strongly international trade in 2009 and caused deeper problems in 
the euro-area, the so called sovereignty debt crisis. 
Notwithstanding, the same conclusions cannot be reached from the reduced sample. 
On it, the euro effect first appears in 1996, too early to be caused by the euro. It is true 
that it has a jump in 1998 and another in 2001, but still is suspicious that the effect 
arose that early. It could be that states within the euro were already integrating in a 
faster speed than those outside before the euro. For instance adapting single market 
directives faster or than the single market had a lagged effect that benefited more core 
Europe countries. The reason why this does not appear in the full sample might be 
linked to the fact that around those years trade with Eastern Europe increased sharply 
due to vertical specialization production networks. Anyway, this would also mean that 
the EMU2 previous coefficients might suffer from an endogeneity problem as many 
authors warned, or if there is something else behind, it could be caused a spurious 
result. 
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Fortunately, within the full sample there are five more countries entering the euro on 
a later date than 1999, so this could also lead us to wrong conclusion. It might also be a 
proof that the euro is nothing but a continuation of Europe’s economic integration and 
not especial happening, being a non-random event. 
If we leave aside the fact that the effect arise in 1996, we see that after 2001 the 
coefficient also reaches a stable figure at 21%, though slightly higher the last years 
when more countries entered the area. Comparing this to the conclusion reached just 
before when the coefficient decreased the last year, I wonder if this it could not be due 
to that the new euro members34 are not taken into account in here. Since the euro 
might have jumped their trade that is now in the control group. In contrast, this does 
not happened in the EU-15 subsample. 
Timing: period 1993-2010    
lnTrade Full EU-15  Full EU-15 
lnGDPo 0.413 0.803 EMU-1999 0.211*** 0.146*** 
 (0.480) (0.472)  (0.0490) (0.0341) 
lnGDPd -0.307 -0.258 EMU-2000 0.205*** 0.158*** 
 (0.382) (0.491)  (0.0515) (0.0390) 
lnYcapo 0.325 -0.496 EMU-2001 0.171*** 0.191*** 
 (0.468) (0.481)  (0.0513) (0.0380) 
lnYcapd 1.141** 0.924 EMU-2002 0.208*** 0.208*** 
 (0.370) (0.520)  (0.0549) (0.0439) 
EU 0.147*** -0.00136 EMU-2003 0.193*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0350)  (0.0547) (0.0431) 
EU Trend -0.0422*** 0.00432 EMU-2004 0.179** 0.215*** 
 (0.00662) (0.00400)  (0.0558) (0.0444) 
FTA 0.122*** 0.00126 EMU-2005 0.203*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0180)  (0.0548) (0.0460) 
EMU-1994 -0.0335 0.0179 EMU-2006 0.194*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0160)  (0.0564) (0.0464) 
EMU-1995 -0.0586 0.0204 EMU-2007 0.195*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0412) (0.0233)  (0.0573) (0.0482) 
EMU-1996 0.00421 0.0527* EMU-2008 0.199*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0251)  (0.0565) (0.0463) 
EMU-1997 0.0535 0.0897** EMU-2009 0.165** 0.232*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0273)  (0.0589) (0.0475) 
EMU-1998 0.133** 0.136*** EMU-2010 0.133* 0.252*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0325)  (0.0618) (0.0509) 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country-pair dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 10752 3264  10752 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001    
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6. Plug and play 
Once a previous model done before by some authors have been replicated for the sake 
of comparison, the joy starts. In this section I will put in place some of the concerns I 
thought about and try to go further and get something new out of it. 
6.1 Non-linearities 
First non-linearity to be addressed is the square terms, as (Persson, 2001) highlighted. 
In the following table it can be seen the results for the full sample. The first column 
show the combined result of introducing in the square term for GDP, output per capita 
and distance. Second column drops distance, and the third one just account for this 
square term. 
One benefit of having direction specific trade flow is that origin and destination 
coefficient can be divided for country characteristic. And so behaves GDP and output 
per capita being significant for destination only, in line with macroeconomic theory 
that export depend just on destinations economic power. Distance’s square term per 
contra is insignificant, that is why is dropped later in fourth and fifth column. 
What cares in here is the euro effect, which is stable at 9% controlling for square non-
linearities. Another interesting point relies upon EU dummy which grow in importance, 
though this increase is not statistically significant. It seems intuitive that entering the 
single market supposes a larger decrease in trade barriers than entering the single 
currency. It goes from 17% to 23%. 
The last two columns include distance crossed with EMU2 dummy, being the last 
column the fix-effects specification that I prefer. The intuition is that as we have 
review is that (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003) found that Portugal and Greece 
peripheral countries where the least benefited from the euro, while the Deutsche 
Mark (DM) block where the most, which are much closer to each other. One reason for 
introducing the euro was that it would make possible of local supply networks in areas 
nearby the border like Benelux-France-Germany area. Therefore, this area might be 
the most benefited from the introduction of the common currency. On the other hand, 
MSO also argue that the DM block saw the largest increases in trade because they 
were already more integrated than others and that the euro might take time, so a 
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Non-linearities within the full sample 
lnTrade 1993-2010 
lnGDPo -0.00949 0.00614 0.926*** 0.0497 -0.663 
 (0.566) (0.565) (0.0226) (0.560) -1.071 
lnGDPo^2 0.0180 0.0176 
 
0.0168 0.0232 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) 
 
(0.0109) (0.0152) 
lnGDPd -2.118*** -2.102*** 0.821*** -2.043*** -3.966*** 
 (0.535) (0.533) (0.0233) (0.528) (0.860) 
lnGDPd^2 0.0583*** 0.0579*** 
 
0.0567*** 0.0834*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) 
 
(0.0103) (0.0150) 
lnYcapo 0.0933 0.0959 -0.0867 0.0377 0.650 
 (0.484) (0.484) (0.0591) (0.481) (0.608) 
lnYcapo^2 -0.00626 -0.00623 
 
-0.00270 -0.0217 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) 
 
(0.0265) (0.0336) 
lnYcapd 2.545*** 2.548*** 0.0560 2.497*** 2.800*** 
 (0.449) (0.450) (0.0546) (0.447) (0.545) 
lnYcapd^2 -0.139*** -0.139*** 
 
-0.136*** -0.116*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0249) 
 
(0.0248) (0.0342) 
EU 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.168*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0368) (0.0359) (0.0383) 
EU Trend -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0072) 
FTA 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.130*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0337) (0.0323) (0.0321) 
lnDistance -3.001* -1.585*** -2.480 -1.570*** 
  -1.268 (0.0676) -1.284 (0.0682) 
 lnDistance^2 0.100 
 
0.0631 
   (0.0893) 
 
(0.0901) 
  Language 0.956*** 0.995*** 0.944*** 0.995*** 
  (0.141) (0.144) (0.151) (0.147) 
 Border -0.200 -0.119 -0.109 -0.125 
  (0.125) (0.112) (0.123) (0.114) 
 Island -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.186** -0.296*** 
  (0.0696) (0.0696) (0.0648) (0.0693) 
 Landlocked -0.0265 -0.0243 -0.0952 -0.0239 
  (0.0612) (0.0615) (0.0594) (0.0617) 
 Transition -0.228* -0.234** -0.246** -0.223* 
  (0.0886) (0.0890) (0.0890) (0.0892) 
 lnDist*EMU2 
   
-0.0977** -0.105*** 
 
   
(0.0308) (0.0306) 
EMU2 0.0914*** 0.0916*** 0.0814** 0.796*** 0.864*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0275) (0.218) (0.217) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No No No No Yes 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
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With the results on hand the intuition seems right. The net effect of the euro is 
positive for the mean value of distance, 10%; but it goes down the more far apart are 
the countries. The next graph shows the net effect for euro countries, net effect on the 
vertical axis and distance in the horizontal axis. Most of the observations are 
concentrated around 0 and 0.15, being the closest pair Netherlands-Belgium at the top 
and below zero are pairs that contain either Portugal, Greece, Finland or Cyprus. 
 
Another non-linearity that I have tries but not included here, as it has been 
insignificant in various ways I have tried, is the one crossing EMU2 with GDP. It seems 
logical that the euro benefit more small nations than big ones due to the exchange 
rate risk I have mentioned several times. However, there is no relevant result for it. 
Next, the same has been done but in the reduced sample for EU-15 countries. In this 
time though the square term of distance is significant but it is not the one of outputs. 
Interestingly in this case the euro effect rise from the linear specification figure of 12% 
to 15%. So somehow poorer, smaller and further countries are less benefited from the 
single currency just in the reduced sample, it seems then that the periphery-core due 
is once again highlighted. 
When tested this affirmation deeper, crossing euro dummy with distance the result 
are less dramatic than in the full sample for far apart old-euro countries like Greece, 
Finland and Portugal. Being the net effect for the mean distance of 13% on average, 
but 3% for the further couple of Portugal and Finland. Still, the reasoning is not that 
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the more damages trade if they are far apart, but it benefits relatively more close 
countries than further ones. 
Non-linearities in EU-15 subsample   
lnTrade 1993-2010 
lnGDPo 1.393 1.373 0.728*** 0.725*** 1.038* 
 -1.250 -1.250 (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.473) 
lnGDPo^2 -0.0122 -0.0114    
 (0.0232) (0.0232)    
lnGDPd 0.335 0.243 0.803*** 0.799*** -0.0233 
 -1.091 -1.089 (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.479) 
lnGDPd^2 0.00876 0.0109    
 (0.0203) (0.0203)    
lnYcapo -6.546** -6.557** -0.396*** -0.343** -0.751 
 -2.448 -2.441 (0.113) (0.120) (0.478) 
lnYcapo^2 0.306* 0.306*    
 (0.123) (0.123)    
lnYcapd -2.233 -2.223 -0.352*** -0.299*** 0.669 
 -1.835 -1.834 (0.0806) (0.0831) (0.511) 
lnYcapd^2 0.0947 0.0937    
 (0.0912) (0.0912)    
EU -0.241*** -0.248*** -0.210*** -0.189** 0.019 
 (0.0630) (0.0649) (0.0600) (0.0601) (0.0349) 
EU Trend -0.225*** -0.233*** -0.215*** -0.206*** 0.0056 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.004) 
FTA -0.225*** -0.233*** -0.216*** -0.209*** 0.00239 
 (0.0557) (0.0580) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0181) 
lnDistance 3.864*** -1.492*** 3.779*** 3.864***  
 -1.064 (0.108) -1.032 -1.009  
lnDistance^2 -0.383***  -0.375*** -0.377***  
 (0.0790)  (0.0768) (0.0753)  
Language 0.561*** 0.307 0.566*** 0.575***  
 (0.152) (0.172) (0.148) (0.145)  
Border 0.0923 0.0220 0.0958 0.101  
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.105) (0.104)  
Island -0.0724 -0.0396 -0.0782 -0.0789  
 (0.0853) (0.0881) (0.0785) (0.0782)  
Landlocked -0.939*** -0.840*** -0.929*** -0.928***  
 (0.118) (0.123) (0.116) (0.115)  
lnDist*EMU2    -0.0906** -0.0913** 
    (0.0341) (0.0332) 
EMU2 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.116*** 0.766** 0.771** 
 (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0282) (0.247) (0.239) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No No No No Yes 
N 3264 3264 3264 3264 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
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I thus conclude in line with (Persson, 2001) that never before were non-linearities to 
be a problem in the gravity model analysis. But in line with the robust results there 
should not be omitted or at least not controlled for in every research, especially in 
those where countries do differ widely from each other (resulting in a higher sampling 
variation). In the following models though, I will not include them so results are easier 
comparable to previous literature and model, and in order not to build up the study in 
complexity. 
6.2 Trade diversion in transition economies 
This as commented in section 5.4, I am analyzing if the trade diversion, which 
benefited trade in pairs EMU1 type35, has something to do with the fact that most of 
those cases concern new EU members. Therefore I include in column 1 a dummy which 
takes one when both conditions are fulfilled, transition economy and EMU1. There we 
see that this trade diversion effect is just significant for transition economies, not the 
rest. In case the reader is thinking about that they are not just transition economies 
but the new EU member, I must say that in this case the coefficient is reduced almost a 
third, dominated by transition economies’ positive impact36. 
Fourth column includes a non-linearity, distance crossed with EMU2 and EMU1. Just 
the former is significant and included in following specifications. Fifth and sixth 
columns include transition crossed with EMU1, drop EMU1 alone, and include distance 
with EMU2. The last column if the fix-effects specification. 
In this case there is a movement up for euro and distance effect, meaning that when 
EMU1 relationship is included the less beneficial effect of euro on far away trade 
partners grow. The crossed relationship between transition and EMU1 now stay at 
about 17% on boosting trade on average. 
This result I think that support the idea I commented before that vertical specialization 
networks with Eastern Europe may have an important effect, as Malta and Cyprus do 
not benefit from it. Besides this could lead to wrong conclusion causing spurious 
results in the coefficient as both event happened around the same time. I remind it is 
an idea that I came up with, I did not check when this globalization patterns started to 
go to Eastern Europe, but as far as I know there are around late 90s and beginning of 
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 One country in the pair is within the euro and the other is not. 
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 The result of EMU1 crossed with Malta and Cyprus is highly negative. 
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Transition crossed with EMU1    
lnTrade 1993-2010 
lnGDPo 0.920*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 0.918*** 0.920*** 0.508 
 (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.468) 
lnGDPd 0.814*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.814*** 0.815*** -0.219 
 (0.0231) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.376) 
lnYcapo -0.119* -0.310*** -0.309*** -0.0869 -0.112 0.211 
 (0.0579) (0.0604) (0.0604) (0.0593) (0.0585) (0.454) 
lnYcapd 0.0251 -0.164** -0.163** 0.0528 0.0295 1.033** 
 (0.0529) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0531) (0.363) 
EU 0.157*** 0.0672 0.0685 0.165*** 0.157*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0404) (0.0410) (0.0361) (0.0365) (0.0375) 
EU Trend -0.031*** -0.014 -0.013 -0.039*** -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0065) 
FTA 0.109** 0.0783* 0.0775* 0.127*** 0.110*** 0.0964** 
 (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0328) 
lnDistance -1.618*** -1.662*** -1.660*** -1.622*** -1.602***  
 (0.0688) (0.0699) (0.0695) (0.0763) (0.0691)  
Language 0.980*** 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.960*** 0.982***  
 (0.157) (0.155) (0.155) (0.159) (0.160)  
Border -0.0763 -0.147 -0.147 -0.0768 -0.0870  
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112)  
Island -0.152* -0.145* -0.146* -0.164* -0.148*  
 (0.0657) (0.0662) (0.0660) (0.0658) (0.0658)  
Landlocked -0.0901 -0.0389 -0.0383 -0.0925 -0.0893  
 (0.0596) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0598) (0.0600)  
Transition -0.301*** -0.904*** -0.904*** -0.229* -0.276**  
 (0.0856) (0.123) (0.123) (0.0898) (0.0877)  
Tran. Trend  0.0368*** 0.0363***    
  (0.00567) (0.00594)    
lnDist*EMU2    -0.0978** -0.129*** -0.125*** 
    (0.0341) (0.0321) (0.0307) 
EMU2 0.110* 0.147** 0.124*** 0.896*** 1.068*** 1.061*** 
 (0.0499) (0.0472) (0.0292) (0.241) (0.228) (0.217) 
Trans*EMU1 0.183*** 0.0783# 0.0975***  0.161*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0413) (0.0259)  (0.0273) (0.0277) 
lnDist*EMU1    0.0652   
    (0.0398)   
EMU1 -0.0444 0.0326  -0.350   
 (0.0615) (0.0563)  (0.279)   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No No No No No Yes 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
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Another specification tried is to check is a time trend for transition economies and the 
rest comparable to the first column (Columns 2 and 3). So that the transition 
economies were much really worse in the beginning but improving and closing the gap 
with the Western. This trend takes a positive and significant value. While the transiton-
EMU1 dummy is still positive (8%) and significant at 10% level37. If EMU1 is dropped 
because it is insignificant, the transition-EMU1 rises to 10% and is highly significant 
again. Thus there is a mixed effect that goes against previous conclusions. 
6.4 Super transition economies and vertical production networks 
I have commented in several parts of this thesis the idea that around the same time 
the euro took place, Eastern Europe countries started to receive direct investments 
from Western Europe. Some of these investments could be aimed as vertical FDI in 
order to take advantage of cheaper factor prices and its closer placement to core 
Europe. 
Until now I have not distinguished different countries in Eastern Europe that might 
have received relatively larger amounts of FDI. In the Appendix it can be seen a chart 
which show the share of foreign-controlled affiliates in manufacturing for some 
European countries. Considering turnover share in foreign owned firm hands, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and Hungary have a large presence of foreign 
investment involved in manufacturing. This can be a proxy to select the countries 
which are more involved in this vertical production networks. Therefore I made a new 
group for these countries called super transition, a dummy that takes value one when 
one country in the pair is one of these countries. 
As we can observe in the results, when this dummy is crossed with EMU1 it is positive 
and highly significant. Whilst EMU1 crossed with transition lose its significance in the 
model. Super transition EMU1 coefficient still maintain its significance when a super 
transition trend is included in the model, this trend will account for the fact that FDI is 
accumulated over years increasing trade every year for those nations. This suggests 
that the euro may have boosted those vertical investments and thus increasing trade 
between super transition and euro countries. As a result vertical production network 
hypothesis between Western and Eastern Europe takes a step forward, it should be 
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Super transition economies  
(Poland, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Estonia and Hungary) 
lnTrade   1993-2010   
lnGDPo 0.913*** 0.915*** 0.914*** 0.928*** 0.913*** 0.290 
 (0.0228) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.468) 
lnGDPd 0.807*** 0.809*** 0.809*** 0.822*** 0.807*** -0.431 
 (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.372) 
lnYcapo -0.101 -0.102 -0.0912 -0.284*** -0.126* 0.436 
 (0.0569) (0.0568) (0.0580) (0.0586) (0.0577) (0.454) 
lnYcapd 0.0435 0.0429 0.0537 -0.138* 0.0191 1.252*** 
 (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0536) (0.0538) (0.0538) (0.359) 
EU 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.0720 0.130*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0367) (0.0405) (0.0380) (0.0377) 
EU Trend -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.015* -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 (0.00658) (0.00657) (0.00581) (0.00769) (0.00580) (0.00646) 
FTA 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.0951** 0.140*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0326) 
lnDistance -1.621*** -1.618*** -1.614*** -1.660*** -1.629***  
 (0.0681) (0.0679) (0.0674) (0.0688) (0.0670)  
Language 0.970*** 0.974*** 0.971*** 0.967*** 0.954***  
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.153) (0.152)  
Border -0.0628 -0.0695 -0.0642 -0.137 -0.0595  
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.107) (0.108)  
Island -0.164* -0.159* -0.166* -0.151* -0.191**  
 (0.0659) (0.0653) (0.0650) (0.0656) (0.0647)  
Landlocked -0.168* -0.135* -0.144* -0.0806 -0.211***  
 (0.0735) (0.0598) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0626)  
Transition -0.307** -0.276** -0.255** -0.848*** -0.403***  
 (0.0948) (0.0847) (0.0874) (0.121) (0.0915)  
Super tran. 0.0789      
 (0.0927)      
Tran. Trend    0.0347***   
    (0.00564)   
Super tran. Trend     0.0220***  
     (0.00457)  
EMU2 0.122* 0.122* 0.137*** 0.155** 0.135*** 0.161*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0289) (0.0479) (0.0280) (0.0291) 
Trans*EMU1 0.0681 0.0665  -0.0165   
 (0.0521) (0.0520)  (0.0481)   
SupTrans*EMU1 0.240*** 0.243*** 0.280*** 0.210*** 0.150*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0508) (0.0385) (0.0502) (0.0372) (0.0402) 
EMU1 -0.0360 -0.0360  0.0354   
 (0.0616) (0.0616)  (0.0566)   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No No No No No Yes 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001     
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6.5 EMU trend 
One argument MSO raised as a plausible explanation of way the Deutsche Mark block 
countries did show a greater benefit from the euro is that they were already trading 
their currencies in fix rates long before the euro and thus they were more integrated. 
So he argued that the euro might not be a one-time effect but it can get time. 
So as they are currently several countries that entered in other years different from 
1999 an EMU trend variable might be interesting to see in play. Nonetheless, this 
variable is highly insignificant in both OLS and within estimator specifications. This can 
be due to either that the euro has a one-time effect on trade or that there is not 
enough variation in the sample for countries that adopted the sample later. 
I do not include the results, I just wanted to comment that though the idea made 
sense, it turned out to be wrong. 
6.6 Oil prices  
When I first saw MSO euro timing results and then (Frankel, 2008) extended sample 
ones it came to my mind that the euro increased trade strongly during the first years 
but after 2001-2002 it turned stable. Hence, it might something else going on around 
that time. Some authors commented that there could be an effect related to the sharp 
fall in the euro-dollar quotation, but the quotation has change in different manners 
along time. Besides the effect it is already accounted in the year dummies, because 
there is no big reason to think that the euro-dollar does affect systematically more 
some European countries than others. 
But there is one other thing that has a great role in trade, and this is the transportation 
costs. This is also accounted somehow within the year dummies, but in contrast it does 
affect in a different way each country. Those whose trade partners are far away will 
see their cost rise stepper than others. And well, which is the main driver for 
transportation costs? The oil prices. As a result next specification will include Brent oil 
prices crossed with distance. 
The result below shows almost the same EMU2 coefficients, and it does support the 
new specification. First, second, fifth and sixth column reflect the new crossed variable 
Brent oil prices with distance. As this variable is time varying it does get value under 
fix-effects specification. There is a difference once again between the full and the 
reduced samples, being nearly insignificant in the full OLS specification and no 
significant at all under within estimator. Totally opposite looks EU-15, where it is highly 
significant. So it can be again be a result of transition interaction. The reasoning behind 
can be that the price gap with Eastern Europe in much higher than with other Western 
economies and despite a transportation cost increase Eastern European products are 
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still far cheaper. In Western Europe whereas companies might change their supply 
patterns accordingly, either switching to closer country suppliers or to national ones. 
Within the EU-15 subsample a 10% increase in oil prices would decrease trade about 
8% on average for the mean country distance, going on a range from 6% to 9.5% in the 
minimum and maximum distance values respectively. Quite a large magnitude to be 
ignored given especially the high oil price volatilities. 
Oil prices and distance   
 Full sample EU-15 
lnGDPo 0.926*** 0.399 0.751*** 1.067* 
 (0.0222) (0.485) (0.0366) (0.488) 
lnGDPd 0.822*** -0.323 0.822*** 0.00539 
 (0.0228) (0.401) (0.0391) (0.474) 
lnYcapo -0.0851 0.347 -0.348** -0.759 
 (0.0585) (0.471) (0.119) (0.492) 
lnYcapd 0.0534 1.164** -0.290*** 0.661 
 (0.0538) (0.387) (0.0840) (0.503) 
EU 0.167*** 0.150*** -0.189** 0.0936* 
 (0.0371) (0.0379) (0.0615) (0.0368) 
EU Trend -0.0387*** -0.0383*** -0.210*** 0.0769*** 
 (0.00569) (0.00659) (0.0559) (0.0133) 
FTA 0.129*** 0.114*** -0.224*** 0.0627** 
 (0.0339) (0.0331) (0.0573) (0.0211) 
lnBrent*Dist -0.0688* -0.0330 -0.116*** -0.115*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0315) (0.0282) (0.0278) 
lnDistance -1.242***  -0.858***  
 (0.182)  (0.185)  
Language 0.970***  0.321  
 (0.154)  (0.166)  
Border -0.0621  0.0473  
 (0.109)  (0.116)  
Island -0.181**  -0.0507  
 (0.0649)  (0.0805)  
Landlocked -0.0940  -0.824***  
 (0.0592)  (0.119)  
Transition -0.252**    
 (0.0883)    
EMU2 0.0858** 0.103*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0276) (0.0283) (0.0287) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes 
N 10752 10752 3264 3264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
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7. Sensitivity analysis 
7.1 Excluding groups of countries 
Next table shows how does the EMU2 coefficient varies when several countries are 
excluded at the same time from the sample. I made for different exclusion groups, Less 
Developed Periphery (LDP – Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Malta), Core 
(France, Italy, Germany, Belgium-Luxemburg and the Netherlands), DM Block 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxemburg, Austria France and Denmark) and 
North Periphery (Sweden, Finland, Denmark and UK). Eastern Europe has not been 
excluded as a group because it has been already analyzed separately with transition 
dummies and the EU15 subsample. 
First thing to highlight is that the coefficient does not vary sharply, so it does the t-test. 
More especially when Core Europe is excluded, where the EMU2 is just significant on a 
10% level of confidence. 
Surprisingly I did find as well the fact that the coefficient rises when DM Block 
countries are excluded. It is just the opposite of what MSO found. A reasonable 
explanation is that all this groups of countries lead by Germany performed poorly 
during the 2000s compared to Sothern Europe especially. Those years are not reflected 
in MSO and hence might have change the euro effect. In this same line lays the fact 
that the coefficient falls when LDP is excluded from the regression, showing that this 
countries had a different behavior. Anyway these differences are not statistically 
significant one from each other. Another point is that when North periphery is 
excluded, mostly non-euro but within EU-15 countries, the euro effect takes its lowest 
record. Meaning that euro has been beneficial and an advantage compared to those 
developed European countries that had not adopted it. 
7.2 Excluding years 
Next table shows the robustness check using just a couple of years of trade data 
before the euro and after the euro. The election of the years has been because of 
some years after the single market took place and then 5 and 10 after that. It is also 
done separately for the full sample and the EU-15 subsample. There can be seen some 
differences but it is quite stable and the differences are insignificant from each other. 
8. Conclusion 
All along this thesis several figures of the euro effect could have been found, 
concerning both previous literature and my own findings. Related euro literature on 
currency unions found the Rose effect to be between 5% and 35% depending on the 
data and authors specifications, while my own research on the extended data available 
at the moment and the inclusion of Eastern Europe on it gives a narrower range 
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between 8% to 12% in the simplest specification; and reaching 26% for the most 
complex ones. The latter figure appears when we account for possible trade 
diversion38 and when we separate East and West Europe. 
In this thesis I have tried first to replicate as similarly as possible with my own data 
previous papers, especially (Micco, Stein, & Ordoñez, 2003). I found several differences 
in the results with it that can be caused by several reasons, yet the key findings on 
EMU2 and EMU1 coefficients are really close. 
Moreover, I have tried as well to develop some extra specifications that I considered 
important and that it made a lot of sense. The relation between euro effect and 
distance was quite remarkable as the net effect was negative for far away countries or 
the negative interaction of oil prices and distance on trade. Non-linearities never have 
been fully accounted for on empirical researches about gravity equations, at sight of 
my results they should be taken more seriously in advance. 
Being quite new the inclusion of trade data of Eastern EU members, it has arisen some 
extra concerns that it would be a good idea to develop further. There is no doubt that 
FDI investments shape trade patterns in different forms, above all in Eastern Europe. 
This is mixed with the introduction of the euro that seemed to have boosted even 
more those investment-trade relationships by an amount of about 20% to 30% 
depending on specific countries, being at the top range those nations who have a 
larger multinational presence in their economies. 
Nonetheless, some problems have also arisen during the data gathering. Missing 
values on trade data during the first years and concentrated on Eastern states or the 
early appearance of the euro effect when trying to time it. A wide variety of other 
interferences should not be forgotten. The deeper EU integration going on these years, 
two economic crises and the amazing increase of world trade in the 2000s due to 
China can be some other things going on that could affect the results in an unknown 
way. Besides, the euro has not only affected trade but also world financing, monetary 
policy, investments and some other areas all of them interrelated with each other. 
Ending up the conclusion, the common currency has had a significant positive effect 
which is at least about 8% of higher trade between European countries. This figure 
should be taken in mind especially for those countries that are still doubting of a 
positive effect the euro might have if adopted by their own countries. In addition and 
concerning nowadays happenings, it should be also considered by those lawmakers 
and experts that suggest/think that some country within the euro should leave it and 
return back to their old currency. 
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FTA situation after 1992 (ended when got into EU)  
EU-12 (EMU year) Belgium-Luxemburg (1999), Germany (1999),  Denmark, Spain 
(1999),  France (1999), UK, Greece(2001), Ireland (1999),  Italy 
(1999),  Netherlands and Portugal (1999) 
 EU EMU EA EAA EFTA EFTA-Other CEFTA BAFTA 
Austria 1995 1999  1994 1960    
Bulgaria 2007  1995   1994 1999  
Cyprus 2004 2008 1973      
Czech Rep. 2004  1995   1992 1992  
Estonia 2004 2011 1998   1997  1994 
Finland 1995 1999  1994 1986    
Hungary 2004  1994   1993 1992  
Lithuania 2004  1998   1997  1994 
Latvia 2004  1998   1996  1994 
Malta 2004 2008 1971      
Poland 2004  1994   1994 1992  
Romania 2007  1995   1993 1997  
Sweden 1995   1994 1960    
Slovenia 2004 2007 1999   1998 1996  
Slovakia 2004 2009 1995   1992 1992  
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Descriptive Statistics (full sample)  
  N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
lnTrade 10752 9.420 25.300 19.531 2.487 
lnGDPo 10752 21.338 28.477 25.580 1.734 
lnGDPd 10752 21.338 28.477 25.580 1.734 
lnYCAPo 10752 6.654 10.637 9.539 0.837 
lnYCAPd 10752 6.654 10.637 9.539 0.837 
RERo 10752 0.000 199.920 93.981 34.807 
RERd 10752 0.000 199.920 93.981 34.807 
lnBrentDist 10752 9.315 14.024 12.205 0.729 
lnDist 10752 5.081 8.237 7.165 0.573 
EU 10752 0.000 1.000 0.569 0.495 
FTA 10752 0.000 1.000 0.304 0.460 
Language 10752 0.000 1.000 0.048 0.213 
Border 10752 0.000 1.000 0.095 0.294 
Island 10752 0.000 2.000 0.308 0.501 
Landlocked 10752 0.000 2.000 0.289 0.487 
Transition 10752 0.000 2.000 0.703 0.640 
EMU2 10752 0.000 1.000 0.139 0.346 
EMU1 10752 0.000 1.000 0.369 0.483 
EMU12 10752 0.000 1.000 0.184 0.388 
EMU21 10752 0.000 1.000 0.184 0.388 
 
Descriptive Statistics (EU-15 sample)  
  N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
lnTrade 3264 16.308 25.300 21.704 1.650 
lnGDPo 3264 24.721 28.477 26.734 1.025 
lnGDPd 3264 24.721 28.477 26.734 1.025 
lnYCAPo 3264 9.215 10.637 10.110 0.313 
lnYCAPd 3264 9.215 10.637 10.110 0.313 
RERo 3264 0.000 111.460 88.564 31.503 
RERd 3264 0.000 111.460 88.564 31.503 
lnBrentDist 3264 9.315 13.913 12.114 0.744 
lnDist 3264 5.081 8.127 7.121 0.560 
EU 3264 0.000 1.000 0.960 0.197 
FTA 3264 0.000 1.000 0.020 0.141 
Language 3264 0.000 1.000 0.065 0.246 
Border 3264 0.000 1.000 0.153 0.360 
Island 3264 0.000 2.000 0.287 0.476 
Landlocked 3264 0.000 1.000 0.141 0.348 
EMU2 3264 0.000 1.000 0.392 0.488 
EMU1 3264 0.000 1.000 0.251 0.434 
EMU12 3264 0.000 1.000 0.126 0.331 
EMU21 3264 0.000 1.000 0.126 0.331 
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Correlation of real GDP growth (period 1996-2010) 
 Germany France UK US Japan 
Belgium 0.861 0.887 0.853 0.853 0.747 
Bulgaria 0.362 0.440 0.332 0.096 0.203 
Czech Republic 0.573 0.422 0.526 0.313 0.756 
Denmark 0.863 0.882 0.917 0.922 0.813 
Germany 1.000 0.831 0.777 0.708 0.772 
Estonia 0.659 0.732 0.866 0.719 0.757 
Ireland 0.551 0.821 0.893 0.863 0.496 
Greece 0.241 0.528 0.660 0.411 0.252 
Spain 0.679 0.906 0.943 0.801 0.544 
France 0.831 1.000 0.916 0.872 0.610 
Italy 0.885 0.926 0.934 0.831 0.796 
Cyprus 0.699 0.851 0.751 0.576 0.405 
Latvia 0.687 0.767 0.887 0.692 0.745 
Lithuania 0.609 0.620 0.810 0.569 0.679 
Luxembourg 0.779 0.935 0.814 0.809 0.535 
Hungary 0.671 0.852 0.914 0.788 0.589 
Malta 0.652 0.486 0.417 0.474 0.572 
Netherlands 0.858 0.874 0.845 0.829 0.600 
Austria 0.894 0.875 0.846 0.783 0.676 
Poland 0.533 0.410 0.442 0.518 0.439 
Portugal 0.668 0.816 0.760 0.823 0.389 
Romania 0.338 0.236 0.377 0.045 0.478 
Slovenia 0.799 0.797 0.882 0.714 0.707 
Slovakia 0.584 0.369 0.540 0.321 0.643 
Finland 0.887 0.903 0.947 0.871 0.775 
Sweden 0.877 0.890 0.862 0.861 0.783 
United Kingdom 0.777 0.916 1.000 0.896 0.724 
Iceland 0.532 0.750 0.800 0.687 0.500 
Norway 0.486 0.610 0.732 0.741 0.574 
Switzerland 0.884 0.766 0.624 0.556 0.644 
Croatia 0.458 0.473 0.728 0.496 0.649 
Macedonia 0.341 0.231 0.196 0.242 0.218 
Turkey 0.438 0.343 0.459 0.522 0.719 
United States 0.708 0.872 0.896 1.000 0.650 
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Real Exchange Rates    
 Full sample EU-15 subsample 
lnTrade 1994-2002 1994-2009 1994-2002 1994-2009 
lnGDPo 0.931*** 0.920*** 0.755*** 0.743*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0228) (0.0356) (0.0364) 
lnGDPd 0.838*** 0.825*** 0.858*** 0.829*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0234) (0.0384) (0.0383) 
lnYcapo 0.00753 -0.155* 0.0961 -0.302 
 (0.0720) (0.0694) (0.157) (0.156) 
lnYcapd -0.0200 -0.0992 -0.195 -0.328** 
 (0.0730) (0.0648) (0.121) (0.115) 
RERo -0.00154 0.00108 -0.0117*** -0.00390 
 (0.00140) (0.00107) (0.00196) (0.00212) 
RERd -0.000342 0.00255** -0.00308 -0.00147 
 (0.00143) (0.000836) (0.00195) (0.00182) 
EU 0.0906 0.160*** -0.0202 -0.000696 
 (0.0516) (0.0392) (0.0271) (0.0314) 
EU Trend -0.0408*** -0.0337*** -0.138* -0.203*** 
 (0.00845) (0.00585) (0.0561) (0.0595) 
FTA 0.0570 0.0980** % % 
 (0.0384) (0.0341)   
lnDistance -1.581*** -1.624*** -1.190*** -1.421*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0712) (0.105) (0.112) 
Language 0.919*** 0.945*** 0.393* 0.318 
 (0.162) (0.155) (0.165) (0.167) 
Border -0.0812 -0.0896 0.115 0.0547 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.126) (0.119) 
Island -0.159* -0.200** -0.0316 -0.0555 
 (0.0678) (0.0642) (0.0755) (0.0799) 
Landlocked -0.110 -0.0764 -0.763*** -0.820*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0598) (0.112) (0.120) 
Transition -0.271* -0.439***   
 (0.132) (0.108)   
EMU2 0.0870*** 0.0746** 0.0697*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0262) (0.0203) (0.0261) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair dummies No Yes No Yes 
N 5112 9662 1632 2906 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  










Excluding groups of countries    
 Full LDP Core DM Block North per. 
lnGDPo 0.308 0.262 0.655 0.451 0.188 
 (0.476) (0.913) (0.570) (0.572) (0.553) 
lnGDPd -0.414 1.032 -0.111 -0.0727 -0.328 
 (0.388) (0.752) (0.522) (0.522) (0.438) 
lnYcapo 0.432 0.342 0.141 0.346 0.519 
 (0.462) (0.868) (0.541) (0.540) (0.536) 
lnYcapd 1.250*** -0.248 0.947 0.953 1.269** 
 (0.374) (0.715) (0.498) (0.496) (0.423) 
EU 0.149*** 0.0574 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0315) (0.0465) (0.0475) (0.0456) 
EU Trend -0.0374*** -0.0442*** -0.0536*** -0.0574*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.00657) (0.00726) (0.00884) (0.00900) (0.00884) 
FTA 0.114*** -0.0384 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.137*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0302) (0.0421) (0.0440) (0.0395) 
EMU2 0.104*** 0.0865** 0.0904# 0.113* 0.0834* 
 (0.0277) (0.0300) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0404) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10752 6168 6612 5948 7476 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
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Excluding years (5 and 10 years later)    




vs.         
2001-02 
1996-97 




vs.         
2001-02 
1996-97 
vs.         
2006-07 
lnGDPo 0.308 -1.531 0.0931 1.154* 4.198*** 2.011** 
 (0.476) (0.883) (0.629) (0.495) -1.251 (0.723) 
lnGDPd -0.414 -1.060 -0.861 0.0924 3.796** 1.302 
 (0.388) (0.900) (0.502) (0.493) -1.284 (0.691) 
lnYcapo 0.432 2.268* 0.447 -0.933 -4.165** -2.109* 
 (0.462) (0.900) (0.645) (0.503) -1.298 (0.832) 
lnYcapd 1.250*** 1.696 1.472** 0.488 -3.456* -1.009 
 (0.374) (0.880) (0.503) (0.526) -1.362 (0.792) 
EU 0.149*** % 0.0632 0.0101 % % 
 (0.0378)  (0.0518) (0.0353)   
EU Trend -0.0374*** -0.0500*** -0.0329** 0.00741# -0.00250 0.0148** 
 (0.00657) (0.00928) (0.0116) (0.00377) (0.00631) (0.00503) 
FTA 0.114*** -0.0725 -0.185** 0.00608 % % 
 (0.0331) (0.0546) (0.0596) (0.0180)   
EMU2 0.104*** 0.124*** 0.135*** 0.114*** 0.0826** 0.115** 
 (0.0277) (0.0308) (0.0371) (0.0284) (0.0301) (0.0379) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-pair 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10752 2336 2336 3264 728 728 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
# 
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001    
% omitted due to collinearity      
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